Israel's Spy Agency: We Mistakenly Ignored SIM Cards

"The Shin Bet did not prevent the massacre of October 7," wrote the head of the Israeli intelligence agency in a report released Tuesday. "I will carry this heavy burden on my shoulders for my entire life." NPR reports that "in an unusual move for the organization" that is tasked with keeping tabs on Hamas, the Shin Bet has published a summary of its first investigation into why the Oct. 7 attack was not detected and thwarted. There were two flavors to the findings, with the Shin Bet faulting itself for hearing about Hamas' intention to invade Israel from Gaza in 2018 and 2022 but not acting on it—but also blaming the government for policies that it says enabled Hamas' military buildup. The major missteps, per the report:

• Allowing Qatar's years-long payments to Hamas: CNN in 2023 provided background on the payments, which Israel signed off on in 2018. Benjamin Netanyahu defended the deal at the time, saying it was made "in coordination with security experts to return calm to (Israeli) villages of the south, but also to prevent a humanitarian disaster (in Gaza)." Instead, millions were funneled toward building up Hamas' military posture.

• Balking at 'offensive' initiatives: The Shin Bet also blamed the government for not greenlighting "offensive" initiatives—attempted assassinations of Hamas leaders—the agency wanted to take, reports the New York Times.
• Anticipating a multi-front attack: Israel wrongly expected Hamas was focused on stoking tensions in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and that any large-scale attack would involve multiple fronts, rather than just come from Gaza.
• Overestimating its barrier: Israel believed the fences and walls that made up its border barrier with Gaza were more fortified than in reality.
• Not building a better spy network: An intelligence operation that went wrong in Gaza in 2018 was one factor in Israel's shortcomings regarding "the recruitment and operation of human agents" in Gaza. NPR notes that as "a closed-off territory," Israel struggled to develop sources there.
• Waving off SIM card activity: Between Oct. 5 and two hours before the Oct. 7 attack took place, 45 SIM cards were activated, which the Shin Bet told the country's security branches "could point to Hamas offensive activity." But JNS reports the Shin Bet was unfazed in its summary of the activity distributed to intelligence and political officials: "Today and yesterday there were SIMs in certain areas of Gaza. This is not unusual, since similar tests were carried out by Hamas last year as well."

CNN reports Qatar didn't take kindly to the Shin Bet's findings, calling the accusations "yet another example of deflection driven by self-interest and self-preservation in Israeli politics and stating that "no aid has ever been delivered to Hamas's political or military wing." (More Israel-Hamas war stories.)